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A PROBABLE NIGHTMARE: LIFTING THE
FOG FROM THE CELLULAR SURVEILLANCE
STATUTORY CATASTROPHE†
I. INTRODUCTION
“BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU”1
Though far from the icy Orwellian description of Oceania, the everincreasing technological advancements of American society create
powerful tools allowing law enforcement unprecedented ability to locate
individuals based on the mechanics of electronic information
transmission.2 Inherent in the ability of law enforcement to easily track
individuals is the encroachment upon the individual privacy rights of
those tracked.3 For over two decades, law enforcement officials have
used information gathered from cellular telephone companies to track
individuals based on cell phone usage.4 Further, prosecutors have
routinely requested, and have been granted, forms of real time tracking
information from third party service providers without the need for a
showing of probable cause.5 Perhaps due to the growing specificity with
Winner of the 2007 Valparaiso University Law Review’s Scribes Award
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 3 (1949).
2
See, e.g., Steven V. Treglia, The Challenge of Tracking: Difficult Times May be Ahead for
U.S. Legal System, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 2006, at 50 [hereinafter Treglia, Challenge of Tracking]
(discussing the increasing specificity with which law enforcement can pinpoint any
individual’s whereabouts by obtaining cell site information and the confusion that results
from enforcing twenty-first century technology with eighteenth-century legal analysis).
3
See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the
Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1429 (2004).
Blitz, building on the thoughts of fellow academics, posits that when the “architecture of
privacy begins to break down under pressure from new surveillance technologies, courts
can do two things to restore their privacy-protecting functions.” Id. First, laws can be
changed to keep the government at bay. Id. Second, and perhaps more importantly, legal
changes that effectively limit government access to information society deems private may
encourage others, like law enforcement agencies, “to build such constitutional limits into
the technology of surveillance they use or the procedures for using it.” Id. at 1430; see also
DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 8-24 (1999) (discussing the impossibility of curbing the flood of
technology and the resulting need of society to ensure that the power gained therefrom is
utilized democratically).
4
See Steven V. Treglia, Trailing Cell Phones: Courts Grapple with Requests from Prosecutors
Seeking Prospective Tracking, N.Y.L.J., July 18, 2006, at 5 [hereinafter Treglia, Trailing Cell
Phones] (describing the recent cases dealing with prospective cell site information requests
and giving a brief history of the statutory framework guiding law enforcement tracking
analysis).
5
Id.; see also In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter SDTX#1]
(referring to the practice of combining a request for subscriber information with an
†
1
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which an individual’s whereabouts can be determined, recent courts
have taken on the weighty challenge of reassessing the showing required
for law enforcement to obtain prospective, real time6 cell site information
from cellular service providers.7 Instead of clarifying the requisite
application to install a pen register and trap/trace device as “standard practice,” which
requires a showing of specific and articulable facts and certified relevance respectively).
6
For purposes of this Note, the terms “prospective” and “real time” have the same
meaning when in reference to cell site information. Specifically, the terms refer to that
information acquired by the government after a court order, authorizing the government to
obtain cell site information from a third party service provider has been signed. The terms
do not refer, however, to information deemed historical, or to information stored by a third
party service provider detailing the location of a specific cell phone in the past. An
example of prospective or real time cell site information is a registration signal transmitted
from a cellular phone, obtained by the government from a third party service provider
pursuant to a court order. An example of historical information is a third party record of a
user’s whereabouts for the purpose of determining roaming charges.
7
See, e.g., SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (requiring a showing of probable cause); In re
the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register with Caller Identification Device and Cell Site Location Authority on a Certain
Cellular Telephone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D. W. Va. 2006) [hereinafter SDWVA] (allowing
limited real time information with a showing of only specific and articulable facts).
Congress actually demanded enhanced tracking in 1997, when it attempted to extend
to cellular phones the 911 dialing services available to wired phones. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18
(2006). The first phase of the plan required third party service providers to forward all 911
calls to the appropriate Public Safety Answering Point. Id. § 20.18(d)(1). Further, third
party providers were required to develop technology allowing the location of individual
mobile phones through cell site information. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost?
The Government Knows Where You Are: Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the
Expectation of Privacy, STAN. L. & POL’Y REV., Fall 1998, at 103, 105 (discussing the FCC 911
Act).
Phase II required third party mobile service providers to have the capability to locate
the latitude and longitude of 67% of cellular phones within a radius of fifty meters and 95%
of cellular telephones within a radius of 150 meters. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(2). For the
remaining 5% of cellular telephone 911 calls, Phase II required the third party service
provider to attempt location and provide that information to the appropriate Public Safety
Answering Point. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(3); see also David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy:
Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communication, COMM. L. & POL’Y, Winter
2003, at 3 (discussing government motivation for cell phone tracking capabilities). Phillips
states:
In the United States, a primary motivating force behind wireless
surveillance is the implementation of emergency response systems.
These systems were originally designed to provide a single, easy-toremember phone number—911—which would route all police, fire and
other emergency calls to a central public safety answering point
(PSAP) which would then dispatch the call to the appropriate response
team.
Id. Further, Global Positioning Systems (“GPS”) have greatly enhanced the ability to
pinpoint a particular mobile telephone. Treglia, Challenge of Tracking, supra note 2, at 1
(noting the increasing specificity with which personal identification based on cell usage is
possible). Of course, in more rural areas with less cell sites, the ability to pinpoint an
individual mobile phone is greatly reduced; however, in urban areas, triangulation based
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showing, however, the resulting jurisprudence confused an already
difficult area of technology law.8 To illustrate, consider the following.9
Detective Doe received a call at approximately 12:00 a.m. A robbery
had taken place at a grocery store on the north side of town. The robber,
identified by a seventy-five year old witness as a “larger black man,
driving a big yellow car” took nearly two hundred dollars from the cash
register before fatally wounding the store clerk. Upon arrival, Detective
Doe viewed the grainy surveillance video taken by a camera at the back
of the store. Due to the overly frugal tendencies of the shopkeeper, this
particular video had been through the machine continuously for the past
two years. Doe was, however, able to make out the man as a black male,
age 35-40, approximately 6’1” tall, wearing a dark jacket and jeans. He
also caught a glimpse of the yellow car as it sped away from the scene, a
car the Detective thought to be a 1975 Ford Cortina.
Discouraged, Doe dialed police headquarters.
“I need a list of all yellow 1975 Ford Cortinas registered in the state,”
Doe snapped.
Earlier that night, Cameron Smith lay awake next to his wife Cheryl,
their two-month old baby resting in the bassinet next to her. He gazed at
his beautiful family, gently sleeping, and said a prayer of thanks for his
blessings. He then turned, checking once again that his phone was set to
wake him for his trip. Satisfied, he placed his arm around Cheryl and
drifted off to sleep.
An hour later, while Cameron slept calmly, a man, approximately
6’1” tall, wearing a dark jacket and jeans, entered the carport of a house
sixty miles away from Cameron’s. The man quietly slipped a metal rod
into the driver’s side door of the bright yellow car. First applying
pressure and then slightly lifting, the man managed to guide the silver
lock with ease. His next step, grab some quick cash before making a
on multiple cell sites can produce staggering specificity, giving prosecutors and other
government officials a virtual map of a suspect’s movement and a powerful tool for
apprehending suspects. Id. Finally, due to continuous mobile phone network registration
(discussed infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text), cell phone tracking is easily
accomplished without the customer knowing she is being tracked. Id.
8
See Treglia, Trailing Cell Phones, supra note 4 (discussing the district split, the minority
position requiring a showing of specific and articulable facts, and the majority position
requiring a showing of probable cause).
9
The following hypothetical is completely fictional and the creation of the author
entirely. Any resemblance to real persons or facts is coincidental.
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break for the border. But, as these things usually go, an unusually
disobedient store clerk interrupted his plan. The man had to act quickly;
he decided to ditch the car, wipe it down, and run as far as possible.
Detective Doe had been working all night. At 4:30 a.m., he had
received the list of nine cars meeting his description. Annoyed and
knowing that the killer could be anywhere by now, he searched the
public records to find if any of the car owners had cellular phones. He
saw that each of them did, and, as per custom with possible interstate
flight, he wrote up a request that the federal magistrate judge grant him
access to all cell site information for each of the phones. Knowing that he
only needed to show the records were relevant and material to the
investigation, Detective Doe was not discouraged that he was basing his
entire case theory on a hazy videotape, a weak eyewitness, and his
speculative knowledge of automobiles.
At 7:30 a.m., the judge, having been awakened early to sign an
expansive order, was not amused. However, he knew that a killer was
loose and most likely running. Further, he knew that cellular providers
had the ability to pinpoint, with great specificity, the locations of each of
their subscribers. The detective had cited authority that seemed to grant
the judge the right to sign such an order and the judge did so.
By 8:30 a.m., Cameron, driving his yellow 1975 Ford Cortina, was
three hours into his journey. He had to be in Chicago by 1:00 p.m. for a
job interview, and the drive from Cincinnati was a long one.
Unbeknownst to him, the cell phone in his left pocket was being tracked
every seven seconds, creating a virtual map of his movements. Within
minutes, he saw lights flashing behind him. He pulled over, cursing
himself for getting a late start and speeding through central Indiana. As
the officer approached, he reached for the glove box to grab his
information. The officer then pointed his gun at Cameron, yelling
“freeze” as he quickly approached the car. Cameron, stunned, obeyed
the man, who quickly opened the door, slammed him against the car,
and cuffed him. The officer, noticing Cameron’s skin color and 6’ frame,
read him his rights and pushed him into his car.
This hypothetical illustrates the problems with our current cellular
surveillance statutory framework. Government officials with weak
factual foundations are granted the ability to invade individual privacy
rights by magistrate judges forced to choose between congressional
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intent or cleverly-crafted plain language.10 The purpose of this Note is to
advocate that the current statutory framework must be amended to
firmly establish probable cause as the requisite governmental showing
necessary to obtain prospective, real time cell site information from third
party cellular service providers. Part II of this Note focuses on cellular
telephone technology and the background of recent statutory and
jurisprudential answers to this growing legal field.11 Part III of this Note
analyzes the two main approaches courts have taken to government
requests for real time cell site information: the hybrid theory position,
necessitating a showing of specific and articulable facts, and the probable
cause position, stemming from the tracking device statute.12 Part IV of
this Note proposes amendments to the Stored Communications Act and
the Tracking Device statute that will establish a clear guide for
government agents seeking real time cell site information and magistrate
judges faced with the decision of whether to grant such requests.13
II. BACKGROUND OF STATUTORY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL RESPONSES TO
CELLULAR TELEPHONE TECHNOLOGY REQUESTS
“Even the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages was tolerant by
modern standards. Part of the reason for this was that in the
past no government had the power to keep its citizens under
constant surveillance. The invention of print, however, made
it easier to manipulate public opinion, and the film and the
radio carried the process further. With the development of
television, and the technical advance which made it possible to
receive and transmit simultaneously on the same instrument,
private life came to an end.”14

See infra Parts III.A-III.B (analyzing Congress’s clear desire for protection of privacy
rights and the government’s dual authority position, a collection of various statutory parts
in conflict with that desire).
11
See infra Part II (discussing cellular telephone technology, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, Pen/Trap Statute,
and recent district court real time cell site information decisions).
12
See infra Part III (analyzing the abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the hybrid theory’s
harm to personal privacy and its disregard of clear congressional intent, and the benefits of
the probable cause standard, namely adherence to congressional intent and protection of
personal privacy rights).
13
See infra Part IV (suggesting amendments to the current surveillance technology
statutory framework, which will serve to establish probable cause as the necessary
governmental showing in order to obtain prospective, real time cell site information from
third party cellular service providers).
14
See Orwell, supra note 1, at 214.
10
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While predicting a totalitarian society controlled by an ever-watchful
government, Orwell struck upon a notion that has come to bear in our
society. Beyond television, the advent of cellular telephone technology
casts a web connecting the world like never before.15 While society’s
ability to be present in multiple places at once expands, the government
has fought to ensure that its citizens are not unreasonably deprived of
essential privacy rights.16 Below, Part II.A begins with a discussion of
basic cell phone technology.17 Part II.B examines the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”),18 including Title I,
which amended the 1968 federal wiretap statute (“The Wiretap Act”),19
Title II (the “Stored Communications Act” or “SCA”),20 and Title III (the
“Pen/Trap Statute”).21 Finally, Part II.C discusses the current split of
authority regarding the showings necessary for the government to gain
prospective, real time cell site information from third party cellular
service providers.22
A. Cell Phone Technology
“Cells” are hexagonal-shaped geographic regions, resembling a grid
of honeycombs covering the nation.23 A “cell site” is a point, generally at
the intersection of three hexagonal cells, where base station radio
equipment and antennae are located.24 Each cell site base station has
15
See Brin, supra note 3 (illustrating the flood of cellular technology in the Global
marketplace).
16
See infra Parts II.B-II.C (discussing the statutory and common law approaches to
cellular telephone technology).
17
See infra Part II.A (focusing on the frequencies transmitted by cellular telephones,
describing cells and cell sites, and describing the registration process).
18
See infra Parts II.B.1-II.B.3 (describing each section of the ECPA, the seminal legislation
on surveillance technology, and the various levels of proof required by each section).
19
See infra Part II.B.1 (examining the Wiretap Act, which deals with the information
actually communicated by users over various electronic communications devises).
20
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the SCA, which deals with communication information
stored by various third party service providers and invents the specific and articulable facts
standard of proof).
21
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Pen/Trap Statute, dealing with non-content
information transmitted at the beginning and end of a call).
22
See infra Parts II.C.1-II.C.2 (discussing the many district court decisions dealing with
prospective, real time cell site information).
23
Tom Farley, Cellular Telephone Basics, Cell and Sector Terminology, http://www.
privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/iii_cell_sector_terminology (last visited Apr. 1, 2007); see
also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3563 (referring to
cells as “honeycomb-shaped segments”).
24
Farley, supra note 23. A common misperception is that cell sites are located within
cells transmitting information from a mid-point to the edges of the cell. Id. Actually, cell
sites are located at intersection points, allowing antennae to send and receive information
from three directions, covering three cells. Id.
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radio equipment that provides coverage for a specified area.25 When an
individual turns on a cell phone, the mobile switch within the phone
determines which channel within the cell will carry the conversation.26
The channel is a paired radio frequency, with one bandwidth utilized by
the base station, known as the forward path, and the other by the mobile
phone, known as the reverse path.27 Mobile telephones use two types of
channels:
control channels, channels that initially set up the
conversation, and voice channels, channels that handle either voice, data,
or call information.28 Once a voice channel is established, the reverse
path transmits the mobile phone’s electronic serial number (“ESN”).29
Even when not in use by individuals, mobile phones send out
registration signals, usually every seven seconds or, when signal
strength fails, by way of the reverse path.30 The registration signals
contain, inter alia, the mobile phone’s ESN, phone number, and home
system ID.31 Data transmitted during the registration process “‘[is] not
25
Id. The size of the covered area depends, inter alia, on “topography, population, and
traffic,” with even smaller base stations dedicated to coverage of hard to reach areas
including “tunnels, subways and specific roadways.” Id.
26
Farley, supra note 23, at http://www.privateline.com/Cellbasics/Cellbasics03. html.
The switch measures signal strength and chooses the channel with the strongest strength
within the particular cell, and the phone continues this technique throughout an individual
conversation. Id. While traveling, if a signal drops below a handover threshold, the base
station (on a channel independent of the one dedicated to the conversation) sends a handoff request to the mobile switch. Id. The switch then finds another channel with the
greatest available strength. Id. The end result is that a single conversation can travel many
miles utilizing many cells, cell sites, and channels. Id. The FCC allocates frequency space
in the U.S. for various radio signals and gives operating licenses to cellular service
providers; cellular telephones transmit a frequency of 800 megahertz (specifically running
from 824 to 894MHz). Id.
27
Id. The channel has a gap in bandwidth, called an offset, which separates the two
frequencies. Id.
28
Id. Many companies prefer to call control channels “set-up” channels, as that is their
primary function. Id. It is important to note that the control channel is no longer utilized
once the call is established, it merely drops off and the voice channel carries the
conversation. Id. Further, once the control channel finds a voice channel, the voice channel
is responsible for signaling the base station. Id.
29
Id. Thus, in sum, a cell phone uses two kinds of channels—control and voice—each of
which use two frequencies—forward path (used to send signals to the mobile phone by the
base station) and reverse path (used to send signals to the base station from the mobile
phone). Id. The ESN is a 32 bit number, supplied by the manufacturer, individual to each
mobile phone. Id.
30
Id. The purpose of the registration is for the cell phone service provider to know the
whereabouts of the phone, whether it is roaming or within the home area, and the
applicable billing rate according to geographic location of the phone. Id.
31
Id. A Texas federal district court, citing the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, infra, described the registration process: “Cellular telephones that
are powered on will automatically register or re-register with a cellular tower as the phone
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dialed or otherwise controlled by the cellular telephone user.’”32 Finally,
when a person dials a cell phone number, the base station sends a page
to the mobile phone via the control channel and assigns a voice channel
to the conversation; voice information is then converted into electronic
digits, compressed, and transmitted through the voice channel.33
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
In 1983, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Knotts34 that
persons traveling in open areas, on public streets, on most private
property, or in any location where others could openly observe them had
no reasonable expectation of privacy.35 Further, the Court held that
because such individuals had no reasonable expectation of privacy,
government monitoring of such individuals was neither a “search” nor a
“seizure” as contemplated under the Fourth Amendment.36 A year later,
however, the Court in United States v. Karo37 held, that a showing of
probable cause was required for any government tracking within a
travels within the provider’s service area.” SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex.
2005) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL 178-79 n.41
(2005)). The registration process is the technical means by which the network identifies the
subscriber, validates the account, and determines where to route call traffic. Id. This
exchange occurs on a dedicated control channel that is clearly separate from that used for
call content (i.e., audio)—which occurs on a separate dedicated channel. Id.
32
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751. Registration occurs even when the mobile phone is
idle, unbeknownst to its user. Id.
33
Id. The court further stated:
In summary, a cell phone is (among other things) a radio transmitter
that automatically announces its presence to a cell tower via a radio
signal over a control channel which does not itself carry the human
voice. By a process of triangulation from various cell towers, law
enforcement is able to track the movements of the target phone, and
hence locate a suspect using that phone.
Id.; see also Darren Handler, Note, An Island of Chaos Surrounded by a Sea of Confusion: The
E911 Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10 VA. L.J. & TECH. 1 (2005) (analyzing cell phone
technology); Note, Who Knows Where You’ve Been: Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of
Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308-16 (2004) (discussing the
use of cell phones as law enforcement aids for tracking purposes).
34
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
35
Id. at 281-82. “A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another[,]” as he
“voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of
his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.” Id.
36
Id. at 285. “[D]id monitoring the beeper signals complained of by respondent invade
any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part? . . . [W]e hold they did not. Since they
did not, there was neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id.
37
468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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private dwelling or in a place “not open to visual surveillance.”38 These
holdings, though substantial, spoke only of government-owned
surveillance equipment, failing to envision the future governmental
attempts to demand similar tracking information from third party
service providers.39 As cellular technology developed, the government
began requesting location information from third parties; however, the
government met resistance by third parties hesitant to provide the
government with such information for fear of possible liability, even
though such fear was unfounded.40 Congress, cognizant of the rapidly
increasing technology and the possible harms to individual privacy,
decided to act.41
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 is the seminal
legislation outlining electronic surveillance law.42 Reacting to stillId. at 714. The Court continued:
We cannot accept the Government’s contention that it should be
completely free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to
determine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a particular
article—or a person, for that matter—is in an individual’s home at a
particular time. Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth
Amendment oversight.
Id. at 716.
39
See id. at 708 (government owned pager planted pursuant to court order in a can of
ether); see also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276 (government owned pager planted during chloroform
purchase).
40
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (individual making a bank deposit
had no protectable Forth Amendment interest in bank records).
41
See infra Parts II.A.1-II.A.3 (discussing the various acts within the ECPA).
42
The main purpose of the ECPA was to “amend[ ] title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—the Federal wiretap law—to protect against
unauthorized interception of electronic communications.” S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), as
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. The creators of the ECPA gave specific credence
to Justice Brandies’ prediction in Olmstead v. United States:
Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home. . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no
protection against such invasions of individual security?
277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
However, the ECPA had vast, perhaps unintended, consequences on technology law
as it became the main vehicle through which the government requested authorization to
utilize cell site information for tracking purposes. See generally Treglia, Trailing Cell Phones,
supra note 4 (discussing the improbability that Congress thought of the capabilities of cell
phone technology when it required information secured from mobile tracking devices to be
obtained with a search warrant).
38
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increasing technology including “large-scale electronic mail operations,
computer-to-computer data transmissions, cellular and cordless
telephones, paging devices, and video teleconferencing,” Congress
intended Title I of the ECPA to address the interception of wire,
electronic, and oral communications.43 Title II of the ECPA addresses
government access to “stored wire and electronic communications and
transactional records,”44 while Title III of the ECPA addresses “pen
registers and trap and trace devices.”45 The following sections discuss
the Titles of the ECPA in greater detail.46
1.

Title I: The Amended Wiretap Act

Title I of the ECPA amended the 1968 federal wiretap statute47 to
include electronic communications.48 Title I also represents the highest

S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556; see also infra
Part II.B.1 (examining the Wiretap Act, which deals with the information actually
communicated by users over various electronic communications devises).
44
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557; see also infra
Part II.B.2 (discussing the SCA, which deals with communication information stored by
various third party service providers and invents the specific and articulable facts standard
of proof).
45
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557; see also infra
Part II.B.3 (discussing the Pen/Trap Statute, dealing with non-content information
transmitted at the beginning and end of a call).
46
See infra Parts II.B.1-II.B.3.
47
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)) (“The
Wiretap Act”). The Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act created what have been
deemed “super-warrant” requirements for wiretaps and bugs. See SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp.
2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (describing the highest level of governmental proof as a super
warrant showing); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act:
The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 645 (2003) (describing the requirement of
super warrant showing in order to obtain the contents of communications in transit).
The need for congressional protection of private conversation became apparent after
the Court first applied Fourth Amendment protection to government interception of a
telephone conversation in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Only six months earlier,
the Court had also extended Fourth Amendment protection to electronic eavesdropping in
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The congressional response to the two Supreme
Court decisions was the Wiretap Act. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557.
48
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000). In the mid 1980s, Congress felt it necessary to amend the
Wiretap Act in order “to bring it in line with technological developments and changes in
the structure of the telecommunications industry.” S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557. Thus, in addition to wire and oral communication,
Congress required super warrant showings in order to “intercept” the “contents” of
“electronic communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510. These terms are defined as:
(4) “intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device. . . .
43
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level of protection afforded to cellular communications under the Fourth
Amendment.49 Further, and more importantly, Title I excluded from the
meaning of electronic communications, “any communication from a
(8) “contents”, when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, includes any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication; . . .
(12) “electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted
in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic
or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but
does not include—
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging
device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in
section 3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a
financial institution in a communications system used for the
electronic storage and transfer of funds.
Id.
49
Title I of the ECPA imposed tough restrictions on governmental ability to intercept
phone conversations. In fact, the Act requires that:
(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as
requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting (and outside that
jurisdiction but within the United States in the case of a mobile
interception device authorized by a Federal court within such
jurisdiction), if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted
by the applicant that—
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a
particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter;
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular
communications concerning that offense will be obtained
through such interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and
have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if
tried or to be too dangerous;
(d) except as provided in subsection (11), there is probable
cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place
where, the wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be
intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in
connection with the commission of such offense, or are
leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such
person.
18 U.S.C. § 2518.
Thus, a wiretap may only be ordered if it “is authorized only for specific crimes, for a
limited duration, as a last resort, with minimized interception of innocent conversations,
notice to targets, and extensive judicial oversight.” SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (S.D.
Tex. 2005).
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tracking device.”50 The section of Title I dedicated to mobile tracking
devices51 allows courts empowered with the ability to issue warrants or
orders for the installation of tracking devices within their individual
jurisdictions to monitor tracking devices that may move across district
lines.52 A tracking device is defined as “an electronic or mechanical
device which permits the tracking or the movement of a person or
object.”53
2.

Title II: The Stored Communications Act

Title II of the ECPA, known as the SCA, authorizes government
access to stored communications and transaction records held by third
party mobile service providers.54 The obtainable information is broken
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C). As discussed infra in Parts II.C.1-II.C.2, and Part III, this
distinction has served as a major basis for the majority position’s adherence to the probable
cause standard.
51
18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2000).
52
Id. Although not expressly stated, courts have construed the language of § 3117 very
narrowly, giving it no effect on the legal standard necessary to obtain an order authorizing
the use of a tracking device. See SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52 (“The purpose of
[§ 3117] was narrow: to authorize monitoring of tracking devices which may move across
district lines. . . . A Rule 41 probable cause warrant was (and is) the standard procedure for
authorizing the installation and use of mobile tracking devices.”); see also United States v.
Mixon, 717 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. La. 1989) (requiring a probable cause warrant before a
government could install a beeper on a plane for tracking purposes); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 720 (1984) (holding that a Rule 41 warrant was necessary in order to monitor a
beeper in a private residence and failure to obtain one violated the Fourth Amendment).
Effective December 1, 2006, Rule 41 was amended, giving federal magistrate judges
the authority to issue warrants to install tracking devices within their respective districts.
The changes included giving the term “tracking device” the same meaning as that in Title I
of the ECPA, allowing magistrate judges to issue warrants authorizing the tracking of a
“person or property located within the district” or “outside the district” commanding the
magistrate judges to issue such warrants if an affidavit or other information provided by a
government official illustrates that there is “probable cause to search for and seize a person
or property or to install and use a tracking device,” and stating that the tracking device
may not be used for more than forty-five days unless the court feels it necessary to grant
extensions not to exceed forty-five days each.
53
18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2000).
54
18 U.S.C. §§ 2703-2712 (2000). Section 2703 lays out various methods of obtaining
stored communications and transactional records. Id. Specifically, § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(D)
states:
(c) Records concerning electronic communication service or remote
computing service.—(1) A governmental entity may require a
provider of electronic communication service or remote computing
service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of
communications) only when the governmental entity—
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with
50
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into three categories: (1) contents of wire or electronic communications in
electronic storage;55 (2) contents of wire or electronic communications in
a remote computing service;56 and (3) records concerning electronic
communication service or remote computing service.57 In 1994, the
government’s burden for obtaining the third category of information,
involving actual customer records, was raised to the standard of
“specific and articulable facts.”58 Prior to 2005, it was common for
jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or
equivalent State warrant;
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under
subsection (d) of this section;
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such
disclosure;
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law
enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud
for the name, address, and place of business of a subscriber
or customer of such provider, which subscriber or customer
is engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in
section 2325 of this title).
55
Id. § 2703(a). Generally, this information is only obtainable pursuant to a warrant
obtained under Rule 41 upon a showing of probable cause, or with notice to the customer.
Id.
56
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). Similar to information in electronic storage, this information is
only obtainable pursuant to Rule 41 upon a showing of probable cause, or with notice to
the customer; however, both electronic storage information and remote computing service
information may be obtained pursuant to a § 2703(d) order (discussed infra note 59 and
accompanying text), the former only when information has been in the storage system for
more than one hundred and eighty days. Id.
57
Id. § 2703(c). These records are available either by warrant pursuant to Rule 41, the
consent of the customer, or a § 2703(d) order based on specific and articulable facts
(discussed infra at note 59 and accompanying text).
58
Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4292 (1994). The original standard for obtaining
customer records was a showing that there was “reason to believe . . . the records or other
information sought, are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.” SDTX#1, 396 F.
Supp. 2d at 752 n.7 (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1861 (1986)). In 1994, Congress
passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, commonly known as
CALEA. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000). The house report on CALEA stated:
In the eight years since the enactment of ECPA, society’s patterns of
using electronic communications technology have changed
dramatically. Millions of people now have electronic mail addresses.
Business, nonprofit organizations and political groups conduct their
work over the Internet. Individuals maintain a wide range of
relationships on-line. Transactional records documenting these
activities and associations are generated by service providers. For
those who increasingly use these services, this transactional data
reveals a great deal about their private lives, all of it compiled in one
place. . . . Therefore, [CALEA] includes provisions . . . that add
protections to the exercise of the government’s current surveillance
authority.
H.R. REP. NO. 103-827(I), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3897.
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prosecutors to obtain orders to secure some forms of real time cell site
information utilizing the specific and articulable facts standard
illustrated in the SCA.59 Beginning in 2005, however, many district
courts began to require a showing of probable cause pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (“Rule 41”).60
3.

Title III: The Pen/Trap Statute

Title III of the ECPA concerns pen registers and trap and trace
devices.61 A “pen register” is a device installed within a court’s
59
Treglia, Trailing Cell Phones, supra note 4, at 2-3. Treglia discusses how it was
commonplace for prosecutors to gain various forms of real time information pursuant to
§ 2703(d) orders, which gain their name from § 2703(d). Section 2703(d) states:
(d) Requirements for court order.—A court order for disclosure under
subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity
offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. In the case
of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if
prohibited by the law of such State. A court issuing an order pursuant
to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider,
may quash or modify such order, if the information or records
requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with
such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.
(emphasis added).
Treglia adds that prosecutors, and most courts, viewed the § 2703(d) order as a sort of
catch-all category for information that did not fit into the category requiring super warrant
showings or the categories of information for which a court subpoena is sufficient. Treglia,
Trailing Cell Phones, supra note 4, at 3; see also James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in
the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH 65, 79 (1997) (“To obtain it in real-time, law enforcement agencies have been using
court orders issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). In 1994, three of the four manufacturers of
cellular switches had developed the software capability to deliver location information to
law enforcement immediately upon call completion.”).
60
See infra Parts II.C.1, III.A (discussing the various district court decisions adhering to
the majority view).
61
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000).
(3) the term “pen register” means a device or process which records or
decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information
transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such
information shall not include the contents of any communication, but
such term does not include any device or process used by a provider
or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing,
or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services
provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider
or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or
other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business;
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jurisdiction for the purpose of recording all phone numbers dialed by a
single phone; a “trap and trace device” is a device installed within a
court’s geographical jurisdiction for the purpose of recording all phone
numbers received by a single phone.62 A court is required to enter an ex
parte order allowing the installation of a pen register or trap and trace
device anywhere in the nation if the court determines that the
government attorney has “certified to the court that the information
likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”63 Finally, in 2001, the USA PATRIOT
Act expanded the definition of a pen register to include addressing
information of electronic communications.64

(4) the term “trap and trace device” means a device or process which
captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the
originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication, provided, however, that such information
shall not include the contents of any communication;
Id. § 3127(3)-(4).
62
Id. § 3127; see SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 752; see also United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1967) (“A pen register is a mechanical device that records the
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial
on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not
indicate whether calls are actually completed.”).
The Court, in Smith v. Maryland, held that people do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in telephone numbers they dial, therefore, failing the first prong of the Katz test.
442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). The Court reasoned:
All telephone users realize that they must “convey” phone numbers to
the telephone company, since it is through telephone company
switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers
realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making
permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their
long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.
Id.
63
18 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1). This is the lowest standard a government official must meet in
order to gain cell site information from a third party service provider. See Treglia, Challenge
of Tracking, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing the four levels of proof required for various cell
site information).
64
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288 (2001). Titled, “Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act,” the USA PATRIOT Act, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c), now reads:
(c) Limitation.—A government agency authorized to install and use a
pen register or trap and trace device under this chapter or under State
law shall use technology reasonably available to it that restricts the
recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing,
routing, addressing, and signaling information utilized in the processing and
transmitting of wire or electronic communications so as not to include the
contents of any wire or electronic communications.
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C. The Current District Split
The ECPA thus sets out four broad, distinguishable categories of
legal process required for government officials to obtain judicial
permission to gather various types of cell site information from third
party service providers:65 (1) To intercept conversation content, the
government must meet super warrant requirements;66 (2) to obtain cell
site information from tracking devices, the government must show
probable cause pursuant to Rule 41;67 (3) to obtain customer records, the
government must show specific and articulable facts pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d);68 and (4) to obtain information from a pen register or
trap and trace device, the government must illustrate that such material
is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.69 Against this statutory
framework, beginning in 2005, many federal district courts attempted to
determine what level of process was required in order to obtain
prospective, real time cell site information from third party cellular
service providers.70
1.

The Majority Position: Probable Cause Showing

The Eastern District of New York was the first district to examine the
question.71 There, the government requested disclosure of real time cell
site information by way of a dual order, the first allowing the
government to obtain the information and the second demanding the
service provider to turn it over.72 The court, after examining whether a
cellular phone was better classified as a tracking device or a wire or
electronic communication, held that the government was required to

Id. § 3121(c) (emphasis added to illustrate changes enacted pursuant to the USA PATRIOT
Act).
65
See Treglia, Challenge of Tracking, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing the four levels of
proof); see also supra Part II.B.
66
See supra Part II.B.1.
67
See supra Part II.B.2.
68
See supra Part II.B.2.
69
See supra Part II.B.3.
70
See infra Parts II.C.1-II.C.2.
71
In re an Application of the U.S.A. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or
Cell Site Info., 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter EDNY#1].
72
Id. at 563. The government sought information by way of a pen register and
trap/trace device. Id. The Magistrate Judge initially expressed doubt about whether he
could order such information and requested the government to provide authority
supporting its request. The government declined. Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/5

Glover: A Probable Nightmare: Lifting the Fog from the Cellular Surveill

2007]

Cellular Surveillance

1559

make a probable cause showing in order to obtain real time cell site
information.73
Federal Magistrate Judge Smith in the Southern district of Texas
soon followed suit,74 holding that the tracking device category is the
exclusive fit for prospective, real time cell site information.75 In making

Id. at 564-65. Specifically, the court stated that the
only [section of the ECPA] that appears arguably to permit the
disclosure of cell site location information is the language permitting
the disclosure of “the contents of a wire or electronic communication”
upon an offer of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that [such information is] relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
Id. at 563 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
However, the court found that the information the government requested would turn
the targeted mobile phone into a tracking device, or “‘an electronic or mechanical device
which permits the tracking of movement of a person or object.’” Id. at 564 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3117(b)). The court likened the requested tracking ability to physical surveillance of a
person, concluding that both “revea[l] that person’s location at a given time.” Id. Further,
the court left open the possibility that the ECPA, by its language, may allow magistrate
judges the ability to give permission for the government to obtain cell site information. Id.
at 565. However, to allow such a reading of the ECPA would be contrary to congressional
intent because it would allow a very low standard of proof for a great intrusion on personal
privacy. Id. Finally, the magistrate judge admitted to having granted such requests in the
past, even as recently as four months earlier, without questioning the legal basis for having
done so. Id. at 566. Quoting Justice Frankfurter, the judge concluded: “‘Wisdom too often
never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.’” Id. (citing
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
74
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
75
Id. at 754 (“[T]he only permissible inference is that Congress intended ‘tracking
device’ to have the broader meaning.”). After a very detailed analysis of cell phone
technology and the ECPA, the court examined the breadth of the ECPA definition of
“tracking device.” Id. at 750-57. The court stated that a device was covered by the
definition “even though it may not have been intended or designed to track movement; it is
enough if the device merely ‘permits’ tracking.” Id. at 753. Congress may have been
anticipating advancements in tracking technology by giving such an expansive definition
of a tracking device. Id. The court continued, “even traditional tracking devices such as
beepers on vehicles are now monitored via radio signals using the very same cell phone
towers used to transmit cell site data. Given this convergence in technology, the distinction
between cell site data and information gathered by a tracking device has practically
vanished.” Id. at 754.
The court then described how law enforcement converts a cell phone into a tracking
device when it uses cell site information to create a virtual map of a suspect’s whereabouts.
Id. Moreover, the court discussed how “[l]ocation based services” will be a large part of
new cell phone features, spurred by possible market advantages. Id.; see also David J.
Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communications,
COMM. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2003, at 11-13 (discussing the rise of location based services and
the market forces driving this phenomenon). The court concluded, “This inexorable
73
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its determination, the court cited Fourth Amendment concerns, noting
that phones may be monitored in a person’s home and without her
knowledge.76
The federal districts of the District of Columbia,77 Maryland,78
Northern Indiana,79 Eastern Wisconsin,80 Western New York,81 and
Southern New York82 followed the same logic, each holding that the
combination of market and regulatory stimuli ensures that cell phone tracking will become
more precise with each passing year.” SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
After determining that cell site information was correctly categorized under
information sought by a tracking device, the court dismissed the government’s dual theory,
which combined provisions of the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute (discussed infra at Part
II.C.2), stating: “Far from the silent synergy of disparate statutes now posited by the
government, the FBI director in 1994 was insisting that the Pen/Trap Statute has ‘nothing
to do with’ the SCA, and that transactional information ‘is exclusively dealt with in chapter
121 of Title 18,’ i.e., the SCA.” Id. at 764 (“‘The FBI Director testified that the legislation
was intended to preserve the status quo, that it was intended to provide law enforcement
no more and no less access to information than it had in the past.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
103-827(I), at 24 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3504)).
76
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765. The court concluded by stating that prudential
interests required a judgment in favor of privacy rights, absent any congressional
authorization in favor of law enforcement. Id.
77
The D.C. District visited this question three times. See In re the Application of U.S.A.
for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134
(D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter DDC#3]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2005)
[hereinafter DDC#2]; In re the Applications of U.S.A. for Orders Authorizing Disclosure of
Cell Site Info., Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531
(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005) [hereinafter DDC#1].
78
The Maryland District visited the question twice: In re the Application of U.S.A. for
orders Authorizing Installation and Use of Pen Registers and Caller Identification Devices
on Tel. Numbers, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006) [hereinafter DMD#2]; and In re the
Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a
Caller Identification Sys. On Tel. Numbers, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005) [hereinafter
DMD#1].
79
In re the Application of the U.S.A. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Installation and
Use of a Pen register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber
and Other Information; and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Services,
Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006) [hereinafter NDIND].
80
In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective
Cell Site Info., 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006) [hereinafter EDWIS#1].
81
In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen
Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter WDNY].
82
In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on
a Certain Cellular Tel., No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 468300 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006)
[hereinafter SDNY#2]. It is important to note here that this is Federal Magistrate Judge
Peck’s opinion. Id. Like the Southern district of Texas, the Southern District of New York
is split as to what proof is required for prospective cell site information. See In re the
Application of U.S.A. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/5

Glover: A Probable Nightmare: Lifting the Fog from the Cellular Surveill

2007]

Cellular Surveillance

1561

present state of the law did not allow the government to obtain
prospective, real time cell site information from a court order based on
any showing lower than probable cause.83 While the majority of courts
Info., 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006) [hereinafter SDTX#2] (allowing limited
prospective cell site information under the hybrid theory); see also In re the Application of
U.S.A. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the
Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter
SDNY#1] (same).
83
In its first decision, the D.C. District found that cell site information may not be
disclosed pursuant to the SCA, the Pen/Trap Statute, or both. DDC#1, 2005 WL 3658531, at
*1. Further, the court held that no other magistrate judge within the district would accept
any level of proof below probable cause for such orders. Id.
In its second decision, the D.C. District once again demanded a showing of probable
cause under Rule 41, this time in reaction to the government’s attempt to acquire real time
cell site information by a showing of “probable cause to believe that the requested
prospective cell site information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.” DDC#2, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 133. This new hybrid theory, a combination of
the pen/trap standard and the probable cause standard was held to be merely an
ineffective attempt to overcome the Texas and New York decisions. Id. The court stated:
I am afraid that I find the government’s chimerical approach
unavailing. Indeed, and to keep the animal metaphor going, it reminds
one of the wag who said a camel is a horse planned by a
committee. . . . Obviously, the statement that there is probable cause to
believe that the information is relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation is tautological.
Id.
The third D.C. decision denied yet another attempt by the government to utilize the
Pen/Trap Statute in combination with CALEA. DDC#3, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 137. The
government attempted to re-interpret 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (CALEA), which disallows
“information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace
devices . . . that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber.” Id. (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002 (2000)) (emphasis added). The government theorized that because its request
combined the Pen/Trap Statute with the specific and articulable facts phrasing of the SCA,
it was not attempting to acquire the location of a subscriber solely pursuant to the Pen/Trap
Statute. Id. The court disagreed stating:
It is inconceivable to me that the Congress that precluded the use of
the Pen Register statute to secure in 1994 “transactional data” or what
[former FBI Director] Freeh called “call up information” nevertheless
intended to permit the government to use that same statute, whether
by itself or combined with some other means, to secure the infinitely
more intrusive information about the location of a cell phone every
minute of every day that the cell phone was on. I cannot predicate such
a counter-intuitive conclusion on the single word “solely.”
Id. at 140 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1002).
The Maryland District, in its first decision, also denied government use of the hybrid
theory. DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 605. The court joined the other districts in holding that
“cell site information is not a record concerning electronic communication service or
remote computing service and is therefore not covered by” the SCA. Id. at 602. Using
stronger language than the courts before it, the Maryland District stated:
The court will not enter an order authorizing disclosure of real time
cell site information under authority other than Rule 41, nor upon a
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showing of less than probable cause. To the extent the government
seeks to act without a warrant, the government acts at its peril, as it
may not monitor an electronic tracking device in a private place
without a warrant.
Id. at 605.
In its second decision, the Maryland District again disallowed the government’s
hybrid theory stating:
even if the court concluded Congress intended the Pen/Trap Statute to
authorize disclosure of cell site information when combined with other
authority, that authority is not the SCA. First, the SCA simply is not
and never was intended to be a statute that authorizes prospective
surveillance. The structure of the SCA shows that the statute does not
contemplate orders for prospective information. . . . The bottom line is
that the hybrid theory . . . advocated by the government leaves the
court with authority that is at best murky and, at worst, illusory.
Where prospective surveillance of a person’s location is concerned, the
court cannot base an order on such shaky authority. Only Congress
may authorize courts to order disclosure of prospective cell site
information on a showing of less than probable cause, and it is not
clear that Congress has done so.
DMD#2, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 395-97; see also Caryn Tamber, Probable Cause Still Rules for Cell
Location Data, KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Aug. 7, 2006 (“A Maryland judge’s denial last month
of a government request to track a fugitive via his cell phone signals is the latest skirmish
in a growing battle over when officials may use the practice.”).
The Northern District of Indiana joined the other districts stating:
(1) the Government cannot rely on the Pen Register Statute to obtain
cell site location information; and (2) converging the Pen Register
Statute with the SCA in an attempt to circumvent the exception in the
CALEA is contrary to Congress’ intent to protect cell site location
information from utilization as a tracking tool absent probable cause
under the Fourth Amendment. The legal rationale supporting these
conclusions can be found in numerous opinions from other
jurisdictions.
NDIND, 2006 WL 1876847, at *4.
The Eastern District of Wisconsin, relying heavily on legislative history, also rejected
the government’s hybrid theory. EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 958. Relying on former FBI
Director Freeh’s congressional testimony in support of the CALEA, the court stated:
Director Freeh assured Congress that the legislation about which he
was testifying and urging Congress to pass had nothing to do with,
and did not relate to, the SCA, to wit, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. In the
face of such testimony, it makes no sense to me that, by the use of the
word “solely” in 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2), Congress was in some backhanded fashion intending to allow the SCA to be used in conjunction
with the Pen/Trap Statute to obtain the very information that Director
Freeh assured Congress he was not seeking the authority to obtain
under the proposed legislation.
Id. at 958.
The Western District of New York, although seemingly more sympathetic to some of
the government’s arguments, also rejected the dual theory and concluded that a probable
cause showing was necessary for prospective, real time cell site information. WDNY, 415 F.
Supp. 2d at 219. The court felt it would be outside the scope of judicial power to piece
together statutes, some created fifteen years apart from each other, in order “allow law
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required probable cause, a minority allowed at least limited access to real
time cell site information.84
2.

The Minority Position: Specific and Articulable Facts

The first opinion adhering to the minority position arose in the
Southern District of New York.85 There, instead of seeking all available
cell site information, including information transmitted during the
registration process, the government sought only real time information
tied to calls made and received by the telephone user.86 Further, the
government sought only information from one cell site at a time,
disallowing real time triangulation and greatly reducing the specificity
with which the government could pinpoint a user’s location.87 Finally,
enforcement to use a pen register device to obtain real time cell location data, at least on
anything less than a showing of probable cause.” Id. at 214. The court further admitted,
that “[t]he government’s concerns over the ‘ambiguity of the statutes’ are well founded, but
it is the Congress and not the Department of Justice who is empowered to respond to those
concerns.” Id. at 219.
Finally, Magistrate Judge Peck in the Southern District of New York joined the
majority position, by departing from the hybrid theory allowed by Magistrate Judge
Gorenstein in the same district. SDNY#2, 2006 WL 468300, at *2. Magistrate Judge Peck
based his decision on the privacy interest effected by the government’s request, stating:
The Court also notes that while the Government’s request for cell site
location information in this District has been limited to general tower
location (not triangulation information that can more precisely give the
cell phone’s location) and only for the origination and termination of
calls, the Government’s statutory interpretation would allow it to
obtain triangulation location information for the entire duration of the
call and, indeed, for all times the cell phone is on, even when no call is
in progress.
Id.
84
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the district court decisions adhering to the hybrid
theory and granting real time cell site information based on a showing of specific and
articulable facts.).
85
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
86
Id. at 438. Notably, this information, unlike registration information, is transmitted
with full knowledge of the phone user. Id. at 449 (“[T]he individual has chosen to carry a
device and to permit transmission of its information to a third party, the carrier.”). The
registration process occurs every seven seconds or when signal strength drops below a
chosen threshold, automatically, and without the users knowledge. See Farley, supra note
23, at http://www.privateline.com/Cellbasics/Cellbasics03.html (discussing the process of
registration and the purposes behind it.).
87
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (“Thus, no data is provided that could be
‘triangulated’ to permit precise location of the cell phone user.”). The court further stated
that this information could not be used to create a “virtual map” of a mobile phone user’s
location. Id. at 449. Specifically:
The information does not pinpoint a user’s location within a building.
Instead, it only identifies a nearby cell tower and, for some carriers, a
120-degree face of that tower. These towers can be up to 10 or more
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the government did not request the information directly, asking that it be
“transmitted from the provider digitally to a computer maintained by
the [g]overnment.”88 For the first time, the Southern District of New
York accepted the government’s dual authority position, combining the
Pen/Trap Statute89 with the SCA,90 by way of CALEA.91 The Western
miles apart in rural areas and may be up to a half-mile or more apart
even in urban areas.
Id.
88
Id. at 438. The government would then use software to create a spreadsheet of the
information obtained from the third party service provider. Id.
89
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127; see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Pen/Trap Statute,
dealing with non-content information transmitted at the beginning and end of a call).
90
18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the SCA, which deals with
communication information stored by various third party service providers and invents the
specific and articulable facts standard of proof).
91
47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000). The court determined that, “construing the pen register
definition as covering the capture of cell site data is the only way to make sense of a
separate statute: 47 U.S.C. § 1002.” SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439. Referring to CALEA,
the court broke with the previous decisions on the intent of the word “solely,” and gave it a
strict textual meaning. Id. at 442.
While we have extracted some semantic content out of the word
“solely,” it has hardly been a satisfying exercise inasmuch as we are
left with the conclusion that Congress has given a direction that cell
site information may be obtained through some unexplained
combination of the Pen Register Statute with some other unspecified
mechanism.
Id. The court felt that to hold otherwise would be to “ignore the plain dictate of” the
Pen/Trap Statute by assuming another provision was intended to intercept an individual’s
whereabouts. Id. at 442-43. The other option, the court reasoned, was to ignore the plain
language of CALEA by ignoring Congress’s choice to include the word “solely.” Id. at 443
(citing 47 U.S.C. 1002); see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.”). But see EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 958 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (“[I]t
makes no sense to me that, by the use of the word “solely” in 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2),
Congress was in some back-handed fashion intending to allow the SCA to be used in
conjunction with the Pen/Trap Statute.”).
After determining that some mechanism was intended to be used in combination with
the Pen/Trap Statute, the court found that the SCA was “the most obvious candidate.”
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 448. The court reasoned that the absence of procedural steps
for transmitting cell site information was easily explained by the fact that the Pen/Trap
Statute, which requires many procedures (see 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c)), was intended by
Congress as the “proper ‘device’ to obtain cell-site information.” Id. at 449. The court
concluded by again mentioning the very narrow scope of the holding:
Because the Court cannot know how that technology may change, it
intends to identify specifically, in any future orders authorizing the
provision of cell site information, the character of the information that
may be provided by a carrier. Specifically, any such Order will make
clear that it contemplates the production only of: (1) information
regarding cell site location that consists of the tower receiving
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District of Louisiana soon joined the minority position, accepting the
dual authority position and attaching the same limitations as the
Southern District of New York.92
Next, the Southern District of West Virginia allowed the government
to obtain real time tracking information based on specific and articulable
facts; however, the court rejected the dual authority position, instead
relying on the fact that a fugitive was using another person’s mobile
phone and was not considered a “subscriber” under CALEA.93 Because
the user of the mobile phone was not the subscriber, the Southern
District of West Virginia allowed the government “the authority to
obtain Cell Site Location Information, without geographic limitation
within the United States,” the most expansive amount of real time
information ever allowed by a district court based on a showing of
specific and articulable facts.94

transmissions from the target phone (and any information on what
portion of that tower is receiving a transmission, if available); (2) tower
information that is tied to a particular telephone call made or received
by the user; and (3) information that is transmitted from the provider
to the Government. If the Government seeks to obtain other
information, it should provide additional briefing on why such
information is permissible under the relevant authorities.
Id. at 450.
The government attempted to re-interpret 47 U.S.C. § 1002, which disallows
“information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace
devices . . . that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber,” by combining the
Pen/Trap authorization for devices that used to obtain cell-site information, with the SCA’s
clear and articulable facts burden. Id. (emphasis added); see also SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d
at 438.
92
WDLA, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (W.D. La. 2006) (“Because I agree with Magistrate
Judge Gorenstein’s analysis of the relevant statutory framework, I adopt his detailed
analysis and will allow the Government to obtain the same information subject to the same
limitations.”). Citing the conclusion that mobile phone users “know that third party service
providers are aware of their general location viv-a-vis the nearest tower, at the beginning
of, during and at the end of each call,” the court concluded that when the government
requests only single tower information, accessed when a user makes or receives a call, and
the cell site information is transmitted from the service provider to the government, “no
Fourth Amendment concerns are implicated” and a showing of specific and articulable
facts will suffice. Id. at 681-82.
93
SDWVA, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666 (S.D. W. Va. 2006). Because CALEA refers to the
“subscriber” in limiting the authority to identify a person’s whereabouts, the court felt that
a person merely using someone else’s mobile phone was not entitled to that protection. Id.
at 666 (“[T]he person sought by the Marshals Service is not the subscriber. The user of a
cellphone who is not the subscriber has no protection pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1).”).
94
Id. It is interesting to note that the court gave a great amount of credence to the word
“subscriber” in 47 U.S.C. § 1002, while at the same time rejecting the government’s dual
authority position based on the reasoning in previous decisions. Id. at 665 (after reviewing
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Soon thereafter, adhering to many of the safeguards present in the
case before the Southern District of New York,95 Magistrate Judge
Rosenthal in the Southern District of Texas allowed the government to
obtain real time cell site information “at the origin and termination of
calls and, if reasonably available, during the progress of a call that is not
initiated by the government itself.”96
Finally, District Judge Kaplan, yet another voice ruling in the
Southern District of New York, held that obtaining prospective cell site
information from a single cell phone was authorized by the dual
authority position, “at least where . . . the government does not seek
triangulation information or location information other than that
transmitted at the beginning and end of particular calls.”97 Interestingly,
the court noted the apparent tension between the congressional intent for
enacting the SCA, Pen/Trap Statute, and CALEA respectively, and the
authorization the plain language of the acts allow when used together.98
the previous decisions on point, the court stated, “The undersigned is unpersuaded by the
government’s argument that Chapters 206 and 121, considered together, permit a court to
authorize use of a pen register and trap and trace device in order to locate a subscriber using
a cell phone in a geographical area, despite the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1).”).
The irony is that most of the previous decisions focused on the word “solely” and
how it was meaningless and contrary to congressional intent. See supra note 83 and
accompanying text. Thus, while giving great credence the word “subscriber”, as opposed
to “user,” the court overlooked the word “solely” as meaningless (a word found in the very
paragraph of the chosen word “subscriber”) in order to allow sweeping government
surveillance based on a showing less than probable cause. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2)
(“except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen
registers . . . such call information shall not include any information that may disclose the
physical location of the subscriber”) (emphasis added).
95
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (allowing prospective, real time cell site information
based only on calls made or received by the mobile phone user, from a single tower, and
supplied indirectly to the government).
96
SDTX#2, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006). In a simple analysis of the
preceding cases, Judge Rosenthal addressed the competing district views and likened the
facts to those in the Southern District of New York case. Id. at 805-06. Concluding that the
government sought information with less privacy implications than in previous decisions
which rejected the hybrid theory, the court granted the government’s application based on
analogy to similar facts. Id. at 806.
97
SDNY#3, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 3016316, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006). The
court used a strict textual analysis, stating “[c]ourts ‘do not resort to legislative history to
cloud a statutory text that is clear,’ even in the face of ‘contrary indications in the statute’s
legislative history.’” Id. at *5 (quoting Co. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261
F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994))).
98
Id. at *1.
Although there is little indication that Congress actually intended that
the Pen Register Statute and the Stored Communications Act could be
combined to authorize the disclosure of prospective cell site
information, the language of the two statutes, when read together,
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Nevertheless, the court felt bound to follow the clear language of the
statutes and allowed the government to obtain the information.99
While a number of courts have made strong arguments for both
positions based on difficult statutory interpretations, the end result is a
conflicting jurisprudence that lends itself to prosecutorial misuse.100
III. ANALYSIS OF JURISPRUDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE STATUTES AS APPLIED TO GOVERNMENT REQUESTS FOR REAL
TIME CELL SITE INFORMATION
“Until they become conscious they will never rebel, and until
after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious.”101
Like Orwell’s Proles, it took decisions by various magistrate judges
to change the common practice of granting government access to cell site
information absent the correct showing.102 However, the judges were
met with prosecutorial resistance.103 The background surrounding the
use of prospective cell site information illustrates an evolution of thought
by federal prosecutors.104 Prior to the recent decision of many districts to
reevaluate the practice of routinely allowing prospective cell site
information by way of the § 2703(d) order, prosecutors realized what
powerful tracking tools cellular telephones could be and began to
request any and all information that could feasibly aid them in an
investigation.105 However, as evidenced by the majority position, once
prosecutors sought to track suspects based on triangulation information

clearly authorizes such disclosure. The Court is bound to follow such
clear statutory language. Congress nevertheless may wish to consider
whether this result is consistent with its intention.
Id.
Id. at *11.
See Treglia, Trailing Cell Phones, supra note 4, at 4 (observing that the current split of
authority creates the reality that “prosecutors, as they learn which side of the fence which
courts sit, will approach those more likely to issue lower proof-level orders”)
101
See Orwell, supra note 1, at 74.
102
See supra Parts II.C.1-II.C.2 (discussing the various district court decisions).
103
See supra Parts II.C.1-II.C.2 (describing the various attempts by government agents to
gain various forms of information including multiple tower triangulation, single tower
information, and non-subscriber information).
104
See supra Parts II.C.1-II.C.2.
105
See Who Knows Where You’ve Been, supra note 33, at 310-11 (discussing the various uses
by law enforcement of cellular location information).
99

100
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transmitted absent any knowledge of the mobile user, courts overlooked
clear textual analysis in favor of legislative history supporting privacy.106
Confronted with the reality that federal judges were hesitant to
allow such encroachments upon individual privacy even in the face of
statutory text, prosecutors then attempted to gain less intrusive
information such as that related from a single tower, from a single
phone, or information limited to incoming and outgoing calls.107 Armed
with the very same statutory text as the majority position, but absent the
overwhelming privacy interests, districts adhering to the minority
position limited review to plain textual analysis and ignored the
legislative history relied upon by the majority.108 Thus, prosecutors have
managed to obtain some prospective cell site information without a
showing of probable cause based on inconsistent reasoning by various
district courts; however, this outcome poses a fundamental question:
Does a strict textual analysis resulting in a burden of proof clearly
contrary to congressional intent adequately protect the privacy interests
of cell phone users, or is a heightened level of proof necessary?109
Part III.A of this Note will analyze the hybrid theory, focusing on
both the benefits it affords to law enforcement and its failure to give
credence to congressional intent.110 Next, Part III.B will examine the

106
See supra Part II.C.1 In fact, a reason echoed in many majority decisions overlooked
plain language as being the improbable result of congress. See SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at
764 (overlooking the plain text of the statute and stating, “Far from the silent synergy of
disparate statutes now posited by the government, the FBI director in 1994 was insisting
that the Pen/Trap Statute has ‘nothing to do with’ the SCA, and that transactional
information ‘is exclusively dealt with in chapter 121 of Title 18,’ i.e., the SCA.”); DDC#3,
407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 (D.D.C. 2006) (admitting the plain language of the statute gave
some validity to the governments position, but concluding, “I cannot predicate such a
counter-intuitive conclusion on the single word ‘solely.’”).
107
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the minority position).
108
See SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“While we have extracted some
semantic content out of the word ‘solely,’ it has hardly been a satisfying exercise inasmuch
as we are left with the conclusion that Congress has given a direction that cell site
information may be obtained through some unexplained combination . . . .”); see also
SDNY#3, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 3016316, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006)
(“Although there is little indication that Congress actually intended that the Pen Register
Statute and the Stored Communications Act could be combined to authorize the disclosure
of prospective cell site information, the language of the two statutes, when read together,
clearly authorizes such disclosure.”).
109
See infra Parts III.B-IV (advocating a higher showing of probable cause).
110
See infra Part III.A (discussing the hybrid theory and its flaws, namely an
encroachment on privacy rights and a complete disregard for congressional intent).
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probable cause standard, focusing on its benefits to individual privacy
interests and its need for statutory clarification.111
A. The Hybrid Theory: A Flawed Attempt
A showing of specific and articulable facts requires that a federal
prosecutor must illustrate “reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”112 Given the low standard of proof necessary for such a
showing, it is not surprising that prosecutors and other government
agents have relied on this standard when applying for prospective cell
site information.113 Further, this level of proof is highly beneficial to
police and federal agents, as it creates a powerful tool for investigation of
suspects based on very little information.114 This is especially so in
situations like kidnapping investigations, where time is of the essence
and facts surrounding the crime are few.115 The districts adhering to the
majority position, while recognizing the benefits prospective cell site
information could have for police investigations, rejected the specific and
articulable facts standard as violative of congressional intent to protect
individual privacy rights.116

See infra Part III.B (analyzing the probable cause approach and its benefits).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (emphasis added); see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the specific
and articulable facts standard). The specific and articulable facts standard is the second
lowest standard under the ECPA, only slightly more stringent than the Pen/Trap Statute
which requires that the information be relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. See
18 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1).
113
See supra Parts II.C.1-II.C.2 (listing the many cases in which the government has
requested prospective cell site information based on a showing of specific and articulable
facts).
114
See Who Knows Where You’ve Been, supra note 33, at 310-11 (listing many instances in
which cell site information has been beneficial to investigators). For instance, the article
discusses a Georgia case in which authorities tracked the movements of a man who killed
two real estate agents by monitoring his cell phone usage in his car. Id. at 310. Another
case involved the death of a Vancouver, Washington resident who was shot in her car. Id.
Her boyfriend denied being near the scene of the crime; however, cell site information
placed him within blocks of the scene of the crime. Id. Finally, in the prosecution of Scott
Peterson for murder of his wife, Laci, the prosecution used Mr. Peterson’s cell phone
records in order to prove his location. Id. Although the evidence was not determinative, it
was crucial in impeaching Mr. Peterson’s alibi. Id. For an analysis of the use of GPS
technology as a tool for criminal investigations, see David A. Schumann, Tracking Evidence
with GPS Technology, WIS. LAW., May 2004, at 9.
115
See Treglia, Challenge of Tracking, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing various cases in which
cell phone tracking technology has proved beneficial).
116
See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the majority position).
111
112
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As discussed above, the specific and articulable facts standard is
derived from the SCA, which allows the government to obtain “the
contents of a wire or electronic communication” upon such a showing.117
Prospective cell site information seems to fit into the category of
“electronic communication” and, presumably, could then be obtained by
a showing of specific and articulable facts.118 However, there is an
exception in the “electronic communication” definition, which excludes
any “tracking device.”119 Specifically, in order to gain information by
way of a tracking device, the government must make a showing of
probable cause.120
The Eastern District of New York used this exception in holding that
a showing of specific and articulable facts was insufficient for
prospective cell site information, because it considered “the requested
information” to be “useful in the same way that physical surveillance of
the telephone user is useful: it reveals that person’s location at a given
time.”121
The logic further perpetuated the court’s holding that
authorization to obtain prospective cell site information based solely on
117

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Specifically, the provision states:
(d) Requirements for court order.—A court order for disclosure under
subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of
competent jurisdiction described in section 3127(2)(A)and shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.

Id.
Id. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”).
119
Id. (continuing “. . . but does not include. . . . (C) any communication from a tracking
device (as defined in section 3117 of this title [18 USCS § 3117])”). 18 U.S.C. § 3117 defines
a “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of
the movement of a person or object.”
120
18 U.S.C. § 3117 states: “If a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order for
the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order may authorize the use of that device
within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that jurisdiction if the device is installed in
that jurisdiction.”
121
EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The court continued:
The fact that the requested order would authorize the disclosure of cell
site location information, “if reasonably available, during the progress
of a call”. . . further suggests that the authorization, if granted, would
effectively allow the installation of a tracking device without the
showing of probable cause normally required for a warrant.
Id. (citation omitted).
118
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the Pen/Trap statute was improper, notwithstanding the expanded
definitions of available material by way of the USA PATRIOT Act,
because CALEA expressly forbade acquiring “information that may
disclose the physical location of the subscriber,”122 if such information
was acquired “solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap
and trace devices.”123
Because the Eastern District of New York focused on CALEA’s use of
the word “solely,” the government was forced to become very creative
with its textual analysis, birthing the “hybrid theory” before Magistrate
Judge Smith in the Southern District of Texas.124 Instead of relying solely
on the Pen/Trap Statute, the hybrid theory combined sections of the
SCA, CALEA, and the Pen/Trap Statute.125 Judge Smith cogently
described the theory:
The argument proceeds as follows: (1) prospective cell
site data falls within the PATRIOT Act’s expanded
definitions of “pen register” and “trap and trace device”
because carriers use cell site data for “routing” calls to
and from their proper destination; (2) CALEA amended
the law to prevent disclosure of a caller’s physical
location “solely” pursuant to a pen/trap order, so the
government need only have some additional authority
Id. at 565 (quoting CALEA, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(b) (emphasis removed)).
Id. (quoting CALEA, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(b) (emphasis added)). As discussed supra
note 64 and accompanying text, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the amount of
information obtainable pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute. Specifically:
A government agency authorized to install and use a pen register or
trap and trace device under this chapter or under State law shall use
technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or
decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information utilized in the processing and
transmitting of wire or electronic communications so as not to include the
contents of any wire or electronic communications.
18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (emphasis added to illustrate changes enacted pursuant to the USA
PATRIOT Act).
The Eastern District of New York noted that although the dialing, routing, and
signaling information requested by the government fit within the new definition, the net
result would be to allow tracking of individuals pursuant to a standard much lower than
probable cause, namely that the information was relevant to an ongoing police
investigation. EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 565. However, the language of the CALEA
forbade such a use, and required that information tending to disclose the physical location
of a mobile phone user to be acquired through some other means. Id. Thus, the Pen/Trap
Statute, by itself, could not be used to acquire prospective cell site information.
124
See SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (citations omitted); see also supra
notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion).
125
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761.
122
123
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besides the Pen/Trap Statute to gather prospective cell
site information; (3) the SCA provides that additional
authority, because cell site data is non-content subscriber
information obtainable upon a “specific and articulable
facts” showing under § 2703(d); and (4) completing the
circle, cell site data authorized by a § 2703(d) order may
be collected prospectively by virtue of the forwardlooking procedural features of the Pen/Trap Statute.126
On its face, the theory seems quite plausible. If, in fact, a court takes
a literal meaning of the word “solely,” then information obtainable
under the Pen/Trap Statute, but barred by CALEA because it may reveal
an individual’s location, may be obtained by the addition of the SCA’s
specific and articulable facts standard. 127 However, although cleverly
constructed, the hybrid theory overlooks serious privacy concerns and
the legislative intent behind the individual acts.128
The first component of the theory, the Pen/Trap Statute, relies upon
the USA PATRIOT Act’s expanded definitions within that statute.129
Although the USA PATRIOT Act indeed added “dialing, routing,
Id.
See SDNY#3, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 3016316, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006)
(“Although there is little indication that Congress actually intended that the Pen Register
Statute and the Stored Communications Act could be combined to authorize the disclosure
of prospective cell site information, the language of the two statutes, when read together,
clearly authorizes such disclosure.”); SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(stating “[w]hile we have extracted some semantic content out of the word ‘solely,’ it has
hardly been a satisfying exercise inasmuch as we are left with the conclusion that Congress
has given a direction that cell site information may be obtained through some unexplained
combination . . . .”).
The use of the word “solely” is significant. “Solely” means “without
another’” or “to the exclusion of all else.” See Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2000), at 1114. If we are told that an act is
not done “solely” pursuant to some authority, it can only mean that
the act is done pursuant to that authority “with [ ] another” authority.
Id. As a result, the use of the word “solely” in section 1002 necessarily
implies that “another” mechanism may be combined—albeit in some
unspecified way—with the Pen Register Statute to authorize disclosure
of cell site information.
EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 954 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
Magistrate Judge Smith in the Southern District of Texas also recognized “that the text
of neither the Pen/Trap Statute nor the SCA mentions such hybrid treatment for cell site
data. The government’s construction of congressional silence might nevertheless be
reasonable, assuming its premises were valid.” SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d. at 761.
128
See infra notes 129-45 and accompanying text (discussing flaws of the hybrid theory).
129
See supra note 64 (discussing the USA PATRIOT Act’s changes to the Pen/Trap
Statute).
126
127
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addressing, and signaling information” definitions to the Pen/Trap
Statute, the Southern District of Texas focused on the legislative history
behind those changes.130 While admitting that the legislative history of
the Act was “abbreviated,” the court concluded that the thrust behind
the addition was to “update the pen/trap statute to cover Internet
traffic” and not to “extend the reach of the Pen/Trap Statute to cell
phone tracking.”131 Thus, in the opinion of the majority position, the
USA PATRIOT Act never intended utilization of the Pen/Trap Statute
for the purposes of obtaining prospective cell site information in any
form, let alone in combination with the SCA.132
Legislative history also dispels the notion that CALEA was intended
to serve as a vehicle by which the government could obtain prospective
cell site data absent a showing of probable cause. In fact, the proposal
was specifically challenged by many privacy advocates before its
passage.133 Many courts adhering to the majority position pointed to the
testimony of then FBI Director Louis Freeh, who came before a joint
congressional committee in 1994 to defend CALEA.134 Mr. Freeh’s
testimony is extremely revealing when considered against the strict
textual adherents of the minority position.135 First, during his discussion
of “call setup information,” Mr. Freeh stated that there was “no intent
whatsoever, with reference to this term, to acquire anything that could

130
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62. The court focused on the house congressional
record concerning the USA PATRIOT Act. Id.
131
Id. at 761. Noting the broad range and importance of the statute, the court concluded,
“such an important change in electronic surveillance law would have been noticed by
someone.” Id.
132
Id. The Southern District of Texas decision also went further, dismissing any
implication that the Pen/Trap Statute was ever intended for information obtained without
the individual user’s knowledge. Id. The court reasoned that the original statute, even
before the USA PATRIOT Act expansion, was “triggered only when . . . the user attempted
to make a call.” Id. The court found that the expanded definition was “incidental to” this
original requirement, and did not dispel it. Id. Thus, even if cell phones could conceivably
be covered by the Pen/Trap Statute, the only information obtainable would be that
transmitted while a user was actively dialing or receiving calls. Id.
133
Id. at 762-63 (stating that the CALEA “was challenged before passage by some privacy
advocates, who worried that the broad definition of call-identifying information would be
construed as amending the pen register statute to authorize tracking of cell phone users
under that statute’s minimal requirements”).
134
See Joint Hearing on Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced
Telecommunications Technologies and Services: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Tech. and Law of
the Senate Judiciary Comm. and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Judiciary Comm., available at 1994 WL 223962 [hereinafter Freeh’s Testimony]; see also
EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 954; SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64 (same).
135
See supra notes 85-101 and accompanying text (discussing the minority position).
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properly be called ‘tracking’ information.”136 Second, Mr. Freeh carefully
explained that CALEA was in no way intended to enable the
government to acquire “information relating to the general location of a
cellular telephone . . . .”137 Third, Mr. Freeh made clear that the purpose
of CALEA was to “maintain[ ] . . . the status quo” and that “all
telecommunications ‘transactional’ information” was protected
“exclusively” by the SCA.138 Finally, Mr. Freeh noted that CALEA was
136

Freeh’s Testimony, supra note 134, at *23. Mr. Freeh stated:
The term “call setup information” is essentially the dialing information
associated with any communication which identifies the origin and
destination of a wire or electronic communication obtained through
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to court
order. It does not include any information which might disclose the
general location of a mobile facility or service, beyond that associated
with the area code or exchange of the facility or service. There is no
intent whatsoever, with reference to this term, to acquire anything that
could properly be called “tracking” information.

Id.
Id. at *29. Directly addressing the question of the Pen/Trap Statute, Mr. Freeh stated:
Some cellular carriers do acquire information relating to the general
location of a cellular telephone for call distribution analysis purposes.
However, this information is not the specific type of information
obtained from “true” tracking devices, which can require a warrant or
court order when used to track within a private location not open to
public view. Even when such generalized location information, or any
other type of “transactional” information, is obtained from
communications service providers, court orders or subpoenas are
required and are obtained. In order to make clear that the acquisition
of such information is not being sought through the use of pen register
or trap and trace device, and is not included within the term “call
setup information,” we are prepared to add a concluding phrase to this
definition to explicitly clarify the point: except that such information
(call setup information) shall not include any information that may
disclose the physical location of a mobile facility or service beyond that
associated with the number’s area code or exchange.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Eastern District of Wisconsin decision pointed out that the language of Mr.
Freeh’s proposed change was not the actual language incorporated in the CALEA.
EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 956. However, the court noted that “the language which
found its way into the law was predicated on the Director’s assertion to Congress that, in
the government’s view, pen register and trap and trace devices were not to be, and would
not be, used to secure location information for the cellular phone user.” Id.
138
Freeh’s Testimony, supra note 134, at **28-29 (emphasis added). As noted supra notes
55-57, the SCA concerns only stored information. Thus, taking Mr. Freeh’s comments as
true, a logical inference would be that real time information could never be gained under
the SCA’s specific and articulable facts standard, as real time information has not been
stored. This imposes a significant burden on the government’s ability to obtain
information absent a search warrant based on probable cause and serves as another reason
for the government’s stringent utilization of the hybrid theory. As Magistrate Judge Smith
stated:
137
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meant “to advance technology, not legal authority . . . .”139 Any notion
that Mr. Freeh’s testimony had no effect on the congressional decision to
enact CALEA is dispelled by the Act’s House Committee Report, paying
particular attention to the fact that “[t]he FBI Director testified that the
legislation was intended to preserve the status quo, that it was intended
to provide law enforcement no more and no less access to information
than it had in the past.”140
The hybrid theory fails on two other grounds: (1) the absence of
cross-references and (2) the timing of the respective acts.141 As
Magistrate Judge Smith noted:
The most glaring difficulty in meshing these disparate
statutory provisions is that with a single exception they
do not cross-reference one another. The Pen/Trap
Statute does not mention the SCA or CALEA; SCA §
2703 does not mention CALEA or the Pen/Trap Statute;
and the CALEA proviso does not mention the SCA.
CALEA does refer to the Pen/Trap Statute, but only in
the negative sense of disclaiming its applicability.142
Coupled with the fact that the Acts fail to mention one another in any
positive sense, is the equally compelling detail that Congress passed
them at various times over a span of fifteen years.143 Thus, the notion
that the CALEA limitation (that the Pen/Trap Statute may not be the
exclusive means by which information tending to reveal a user’s location
can be obtained—effective 1998) was intended by Congress to be
circumvented by the SCA (effective 1986) is impossible, as the Pen/Trap

By mixing and matching statutory provisions in this manner, the
government concludes that cell site data enjoys a unique status under
electronic surveillance law—a new form of electronic surveillance
combining the advantages of the pen/trap law and the SCA (real-time
location tracking based on less than probable cause) without their
respective limitations.
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761.
139
Freeh’s Testimony, supra note 134, at *28.
140
H.R. REP. NO. 103-827(I), at 22 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3509. The
report also noted that a goal of the CALEA was to “protect[ ] the privacy of
communications.” Id. at 9. Again, Congress referred to electronic surveillance orders and
not a lower standard. Id.
141
See SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 764.
142
Id.
143
See supra note 42 (SCA enacted in 1986); see also supra note 58 (CALEA enacted in 1994,
effective 1998); supra note 64 (USA PATRIOT Act enacted in 2001).
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Statute was not expanded to include routing information from electronic
communications until 2001 by way of the USA PATRIOT Act.144
The hybrid theory represents a dramatically flawed governmental
attempt to piece together history at the expense of individual privacy,
because (1) neither the SCA, CALEA, nor the Pen/Trap Statute were
individually intended to grant government access to prospective cell site
information; (2) legislative history illustrates that Congress never
intended for the government to obtain prospective cell site information
absent a showing of probable cause; and (3) the Acts necessary for the
hybrid theory fail to mention each other, even when they had fifteen
years to do so.
B. Probable Cause Showing
As applied to prospective cell site information, the probable cause
standard springs from the definition of a “tracking device,” which allows
a court, empowered with the ability to issue a warrant for a tracking
device, to do so upon a showing of probable cause.145 In December, 2006,
federal magistrate judges received such power by way of the newly
revised Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.146 Like the tracking
device definition, Rule 41 requires a probable cause showing before the
Magistrate Judge Smith noted the irony:
If as the government contends all three statutes were necessary for
conception, then the statutory authority for this surveillance technique
was obviously born after the PATRIOT Act amendments of 2001. But
this timing undercuts any inference that the CALEA proviso (passed
1994, effective 1998) authorized disclosure of location information
under the SCA “specific and articulable facts” standard. What need of
subsequent legislation if CALEA already did the trick? On the other
hand, if CALEA itself marked the true birth date, then the expanded
pen/trap definitions in the subsequent PATRIOT Act are rendered
immaterial to the analysis. But without the expanded pen/trap
definitions, there is no basis to argue that the Pen/Trap Statute
covered cell site data; the old definitions only covered numbers dialed.
And without the Pen/Trap Statute’s prospective features, so clearly
lacking in the SCA scheme, the statutory underpinnings for
monitoring of cell phone location simply collapse.
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d. at 765.
145
18 U.S.C. § 3117(d) states: “If a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order
for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order may authorize the use of that
device within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that jurisdiction if the device is
installed in that jurisdiction.”
146
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. The revised rules states that “a magistrate judge with authority in
the district has authority to issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device;
the warrant may authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or property
located within the district, outside the district, or both.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4).
144
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government can receive authorization for the use of a tracking device.147
Contrary to a showing of specific and articulable facts, a probable cause
showing requires the government to “identify the person or property to
be tracked, designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned,
and specify a reasonable length of time that the device may be used.”148
Thus, the question becomes whether prospective cell site
information is information the government must obtain from a tracking
device.149 Obviously, cellular phones are more closely tied to the
individual user’s person than a landline telephone.150 In fact, as early as
1999 Congress indicated that cellular phones presented a threat to
individual privacy because they “are normally directly associated with
the physical presence of the individual user, and are carried by those
users into places where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.”151
Further, as discussed above, GPS technology and government-mandated
911 capabilities have sparked an increase in the specificity with which a
cellular service provider can identify a particular user’s location.152
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (“After receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate
judge—or if authorized by Rule 41(b), a judge of a state court of record—must issue the
warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize a person or property or to install and
use a tracking device.”) (emphasis added).
148
Id. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1239 (8th ed. 2004), defines “probable cause” as
a reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is
committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected
with a crime. Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause–which
amounts to more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that
would justify conviction—must be shown before an arrest warrant or
search warrant may be issued.
149
A tracking device is “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of
the movement of a person or object.” 18 U.S.C. § 3117.
150
See For Many People, their cell phone has become their only phone, USA Today (2003),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-03-24-cell-phones_x.htm (discussing that as of 2003, over 7 million people use only cellular phones with no land line, citing
mobility and cost as reasons for the shift).
151
145 Cong. Rec. S4033-01, S4048 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1999), available at 1999 WL 230074.
The statement came during discussion of the “Electronic Rights (E-RIGHTS) for the 21st
Century Act,” in which the discussion continued:
Tracking of cellular telephones, even more-so than automobiles,
implicates the movements of a person going about his or her business
and personal life. Should the government seek to track a person by
surreptitiously placing a mobile tracking device on that person’s
automobile, a court order would be required based upon a finding of
probable cause. No less should be required for use by the government
of a wireless telephone as a tracking device.
Id. (citations omitted).
152
See Treglia, Challenge of Tracking, supra note 2 (discussing the increasing specificity
with witch law enforcement can pinpoint and individuals whereabouts by obtaining cell
site information and the confusion that results from enforcing twenty-first century
147
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Finally, the most recent push for user location identification cellular
phone technology has been the market.153 The result of these stimuli is
that tracking capabilities based on cellular phone technology are

technology with eighteenth century legal analysis); Schumann, supra note 114, at 9
(analyzing the use of GPS technology as a tool for criminal investigations); Werdegar, supra
note 7, at 105 (discussing the FCC 911 Act and the government mandate that cellular
phones be geographically traceable). Congress also noted governmental influence on
tracking capabilities:
Civil liberties experts have noted that cellular telephone technology “is
proceeding in the direction of providing more precise location
information, a trend that has been boosted by the rulings of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in its “E911” (Enhanced 911)
proceeding, which requires service providers to develop a locator
capability for medical emergency and rescue purposes.” Specifically,
the FCC is requiring wireless service providers to modify their systems
to enable them to relay to public safety authorities the cell site location
of 911 callers. Carriers must also take steps to deploy the capability to
provide latitude and longitude information of wireless telephone
callers within 125 meters and, ultimately, to locate a caller within a 40foot radius for longitude, latitude and altitude, to enable locating a
caller within a tall building. In a separate proceeding, the FCC in
October 1998 proposed ruling that a location tracking capability for
wireless telephones was required under the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).
The FCC has
tentatively concluded that carriers must have the capability of
providing to law enforcement a caller’s cell site location at the
beginning and termination of a call. Whether this capability is
ultimately required by the FCC as part of CALEA, there is no doubt that
real-time location information will be increasingly available to law
enforcement agencies.
145 Cong. Rec. S4033-01, S4048 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1999), available at 1999 WL 230074
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
153
See Phillips, supra note 7, at 11-12 (discussing the rise of location-based services and
the market forces driving this phenomenon). Phillips, after discussing the emergency
response and law enforcement stimuli for location information states:
Wireless access providers are preparing to . . . for[m] alliances with
portals, applications providers and ad servers. . . . More importantly,
they are adding real-time location and mobility patterns to the set of
data according to which the user’s experience is personalized.
Geographically specific data may be served in several ways. The
user’s ISP can be inferred from the IP address. Therefore, since many
ISPs are regional concerns, the user’s geographic location can be
surmised as well. Or the user may explicitly request information
pertaining to a specific region, for example, by entering a ZIP code. Or
locationally specific content may be sent only from a particular wireless
cell, much as in a broadcast model. The marketer’s ideal, however, is
to serve content personalized for each user based on that user’s
historical profile and precise, current location.
Id. (emphasis added).
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expanding rapidly, with no clear incentives to stop.154 Ever-increasing
tracking capabilities built into cellular telephones, devices known by
Congress to be kept within individuals’ clothing, homes, and other
private areas, point heavily towards the conclusion that cellular phones,
when used by the government to acquire prospective, real time cell site
information, fit firmly within the definition of a tracking device.155
Courts agree. The Eastern District of New York identified cellular
phones as tracking devices because they “revea[l] [a] person’s location at
a given time.”156 The Southern District of Texas also concluded that
“prospective cell site data is properly categorized as tracking device
information.”157 The District of Columbia,158 Maryland,159 Northern
Indiana,160 and Southern New York161 districts each agreed that
154
See id. at 16 (“To summarize, in three different arenas and for three different purposes,
the locational surveillance capacity of the wireless telecommunication network is
expanding. In each of these arenas, different social values, legal theories and economic
structures are called upon.”).
155
See Farley, supra note 23 (concluding that the purpose of the registration is for the cell
phone service provider to know the whereabouts of the phone, whether it is roaming or
within the home area, and the applicable billing rate according to geographic location of
the phone). Whether during the registration process or while receiving information from
an active call, what is clear is that cellular phones obviously may be used by the
government to “trac[k] the movement of a person . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3117.
156
EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
157
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005). The court felt that the mere possibility
that Fourth Amendment Privacy rights could be implicated required the data to be so
classified, stating: “Because the government cannot demonstrate that cell site tracking
could never under any circumstance implicate Fourth Amendment privacy rights, there is
no reason to treat cell phone tracking differently from other forms of tracking under 18
U.S.C. § 3117, which routinely require probable cause.” Id.
158
DDC#3, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that in 1994, the
government had no knowledge of the high capability cellular phones now have to locate
individuals’ whereabouts); DDC#1, Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05411, 2005 WL 3658531, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005) (adopting the reasoning of the Eastern
District of New York and Southern District of Texas decisions).
159
DMD#2, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 n.9 (D. Md. 2006) (“I am not convinced by the
government’s argument that the information requested here does not convert a cell phone
into a tracking device. The definition of ‘tracking device’ is broad and contains no
articulation of how precise a device must be.”); DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (D. Md.
2005) (“the acquisition of real time cell site information converts a cell phone into a tracking
device under 18 U.S.C. § 3117”).
160
NDIND, Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006)
(“converging the Pen Register Statute with the SCA in an attempt to circumvent the
exception in the CALEA is contrary to Congress’ intent to protect cell site location
information from utilization as a tracking tool absent probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment”).
161
SDNY#2, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 468300, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006)
(stating that “statutory authority for prospective cell site location information is lacking”
and adopting the reasoning of the prior decisions.).
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prospective cell site data most closely fits within the tracking device
definition, requiring a showing of probable cause. Further, the minority
position decisions note the capability of cellular phone tracking, but
allow the specific and articulable facts standard for only imprecise
general location requests.162
Consequently, although there is agreement that cellular telephones
can be used as tracking devices, the statutory language as it currently
stands opens the door to governmental abuse.163 Prosecutors are able to
piece together statutory language originating over a fifteen-year span, in
direct contravention to congressional intent.164 Because the plain
language of the SCA, CALEA, and the Pen/Trap Statute all combine to
form a framework that, by its very terms, could give government agents
authority to gain access to prospective cell site information, some Courts
feel obligated to honor the hybrid theory over legislative history clearly
to the contrary.165
Thus, Congress must clarify the statutory language surrounding the
ability of government officials to obtain prospective cell site
information.166 In order to protect individual privacy interests, the most
appropriate option is for Congress to mandate a governmental showing
of probable cause.

162
See e.g., WDLA, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006) (“The Government does not
seek (and the court does not authorize the release of) GPS information. The Government
also does not seek (and the court does not authorize the release of) cell site information that
might be available when the cell phone is off or when no call is made or received. Thus,
even if one accepts the argument that a cell phone could be considered a ‘tracking device,’
the Government’s application does not seek tracking information from it.”); SDNY#3, No.
06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 3016316, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006) (accepting the hybrid
theory “at least where . . . the government does not seek triangulation information or
location information other than that transmitted at the beginning and end of particular
calls.”); SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (allowing prospective, real time
cell site information based only on calls made or received by the mobile phone user, from a
single tower, and supplied indirectly to the government); id. at 445 (noting the tension
between the obvious tracking capabilities of cell phones and the electronic communication
transmitted by the phone service, noting that the former would require a showing of
probable cause and the latter is covered under the SCA).
163
See infra Part IV (suggesting amendments to the current surveillance statutory
scheme).
164
See supra notes 125-45 and accompanying text (analyzing the hybrid theory and its
flaws).
165
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the decisions adhering to the minority position).
166
See infra Part IV (suggesting amendments to the current surveillance statutory
scheme).
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IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
“The proles, normally apathetic about the war, were being
lashed into one of their periodical frenzies of patriotism.”167
Fortunately, this tricky problem is easily fixed. Congress has
consistently understood the danger that government acquisition of
cellular telephone information presents to individual privacy rights.168
Where recognition has excelled, however, execution has fallen short.169
Congress has left judges with a difficult choice: obey a plausible
statutory reading of various acts in contravention to congressional intent
and privacy rights, or adhere to congressional intent and dispel plain
language that possibly grants authority to gain valuable investigatory
information.170 Faced with this decision, judges have split, choosing to
adhere to intent when there exists a likelihood of substantial harm to
privacy rights and plain language when privacy right infringement
seems less severe.171 Thus, this Note proposes several amendments to
the electronic surveillance statutory framework.
First, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) of the SCA must be amended to clearly exclude any
prospective, real time cell site information from the specific and
articulable facts standard.172 Second, 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) must be clarified
to illustrate that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 is the exclusive
means by which a tracking device may be installed in a federal
jurisdiction.173 Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) must be amended to reflect
that prospective, real time cell site information fits within the definition
of a tracking device.174
A. Congress Should Amend 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) as Follows:
(d) Requirements for court order.—A court order for disclosure
under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a
court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the
governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing
See Orwell, supra note 1, at 150.
See supra Part III.B (discussing congressional intent behind the SCA, CALEA, and
Pen/Trap Statute).
169
See supra Part III.A (discussing the possibility of the hybrid theory due to ambiguous
statutory language).
170
See supra Parts III.A-III.B (analyzing the hybrid theory and the probable cause
approach to government requests for real time cell site information).
171
See supra Part III (analyzing the various factors considered when allowing the dual
authority position).
172
See infra Part IV.A.
173
See infra Part IV.B.
174
See infra Part IV.B.
167
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that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation. However, a court may not order disclosure to
the government of any prospective, or real time cell site information
from any third-party service provider regarding a specific cellular
telephone, or any electronic or mechanical device which permits the
tracking of the movement of a person or object, absent a showing of
probable cause pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(d)(1) or a showing of consent from the customer or subscriber. In
the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order
shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court
issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made
promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify such
order, if the information or records requested are unusually
voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise
would cause an undue burden on such provider.175
Commentary
This addition serves the necessary purpose of ending the dual
authority position. A central premise of the hybrid theory was to
circumvent the CALEA requirement of an additional authority in order
to gain access to electronic communications.176 However, the addition of
the proposed limiting language disallows the chosen method of
circumvention, a § 2703(d) order, and forces a governmental showing of
probable cause pursuant to Rule 41 in order to obtain prospective, real
time cell site information from third party providers.
Also, although the section is non-applicable to state requests, the
change will serve as an example to state legislatures, encouraging them
to address the problems presented in the federal forum and take a
proactive approach to surveillance challenges. Further, the added
language leaves open the possibility of subscriber or customer consent
absent a showing of probable cause, a central concern to the Southern
District of West Virginia, in the situation of a fugitive carrying another
user’s cellular telephone.177 The consent exception will balance the
privacy rights of cellular telephone subscribers, a chief congressional
175
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). The normal font represents the language of the original statute.
The text that appears in italics is the proposed language from the author.
176
See supra notes 125-45 and accompanying text (discussing the hybrid theory).
177
See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (analyzing the Southern District of West
Virginia decision and focusing on the lack of a subscriber).
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goal of CALEA,178 with the need of police officers to obtain wholly
unknown non-subscriber fugitives by way of cellular technology.179
B. Congress Should Amend 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) as Follows:
(a) In general.—If a court is empowered to issue a warrant or
other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such
order may authorize the use of that device within the jurisdiction
of the court, and outside the jurisdiction if the device is installed
in that jurisdiction. upon a showing of probable cause pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(1).180
Commentary
Already present in the language of § 3117(a) is a demand for
authorization of power to install tracking devices within a court’s
jurisdiction.181 In December of 2006, federal magistrate judges received
such power by way of Rule 41.182 The proposed language updates the
tracking device provision and creates synergy between the two
provisions, making it absolutely clear that tracking devices may only be
installed pursuant to a showing of probable cause. Further, the
subtraction of the phrase “or other order” from the language of the
tracking device statute serves to eliminate future attempts by the
government to circumvent the requirements of a probable cause
showing.
C. Congress Should Amend 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) and Create 18 U.S.C.
§ 3117(c) as Follows:
(b) Definition.—As used in this section, the term “tracking
device” means any device utilized by the government to obtain
prospective information or real time information tending to reveal a
mobile subscriber’s location, or any electronic or mechanical device

178
See supra notes 135-40 (discussing former FBI Director Freeh’s numerous assertions
that CALEA was intended merely to advance technology law, not government interference
with privacy).
179
See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of CALEA’s
exception to only “subscriber[s]”).
180
18 U.S.C. § 3117(a). The normal font represents the language of the original statute.
The text that appears in italics is the proposed language from the author. The text that is
struck through represents the text the author wishes to delete from the statute.
181
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a).
182
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4) (stating, “a magistrate judge with authority in the district has
authority to issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device”).
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which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or
object.183
(c) Definition.—As used in this section, the terms “prospective
information” and “real time information” mean information acquired
by the government after a court order, granted upon a showing of
probable cause, authorizing the government to obtain information from
a third party service provider, has been signed by a Federal Judge
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(1). However,
records stored by a third party service provider detailing the past
location of a tracking device are deemed “historical information,”
covered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703-2712.184
Commentary
The final change to the tracking device statute leaves no room for
prosecutorial disobedience of clear congressional intent. By properly
classifying cellular phones used by the government to gain prospective,
real time information as tracking devices, the current difficult judicial
decision is replaced with clear understanding: If the government seeks
real time information tending to reveal a mobile subscriber’s location,
probable cause must be shown before the court shall grant authorization.
The tracking device definition also leaves room for technology growth,
as cellular phones will presumably be replaced in the future by new
technology. The proposed “tracking device” definition, coupled with the
proposed “prospective information” and “real time information”
definitions, would apply to all current and future devices maintained by
third party service providers with the capability of transmitting location
information about a user’s whereabouts.
The proposed definitions for “prospective information,” “real time
information,” and “historical information” distinguish information
covered under the tracking device statute from that covered under the
SCA.185 Whereas the tracking device statute covers all prospective or
real time information (that obtained after a court order pursuant to Rule
41), the SCA is preserved as the correct governing act for all stored or
“historical” information.

183
18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). The normal font represents the language of the original statute.
The text that appears in italics is the proposed language from the author.
184
The text that appears in italics is the proposed language from the author.
185
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the SCA, applicable to all stored communications or
historical information as opposed to prospective or real time information).
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The proposed changes work together to bring the current outdated
statutory framework into line with present and future technological
advancements. Further, prosecutors may continue to reap the benefits
cellular technology provides to law enforcement, while judges have the
clear authority to demand that personal privacy rights be upheld.
Finally, the highly intrusive nature of cellular telephone information,
possibly obtained unbeknownst to the cellular subscriber, is properly
categorized as a tracking device requiring a governmental showing of
probable cause before being obtained.
V. CONCLUSION
“But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle
was finished.”186
The proposed changes discussed in Part IV would save Cameron,
our unfortunate character in Part I of this Note, from a world of
embarrassment, fear, and privacy invasion.187 Instead of succumbing to
the pressure of government agents rushing for the apprehension of a
loose criminal, the magistrate judge would require Detective Doe to
present probable cause for a warrant search of Cameron’s phone. In fact,
knowing that such a showing was not feasible based on the current facts,
the added protection of a probable cause requirement would force
Detective Doe to conduct a thorough investigation, sparing the privacy
invasion to nine innocent persons. Cameron would continue on to
Chicago and possibly land his dream job, instead of being forced to
explain that he was late due to an arrest for murder. Although such
slipshod investigations may lead to intermittent lucky finds, Congress
has been clear that privacy interests must prevail in this time when
technological gains tempt the government to fulfill many of Orwell’s
darkest visions. With the suggested changes presented above, Congress
can present a clear standard of probable cause in conformity with its
previous intentions.
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